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Abstract
Recent studies propose membership inference (MI) attacks on deep models. De-
spite the moderate accuracy of such MI attacks, we show that the way the attack
accuracy is reported is often misleading and a simple blind attack which is highly
unreliable and inefficient in reality can often represent similar accuracy. We show
that the current MI attack models can only identify the membership of misclassified
samples with mediocre accuracy at best, which only constitute a very small portion
of training samples. We analyze several new features that have not been explored
for membership inference before, including distance to the decision boundary and
gradient norms, and conclude that deep models’ responses are mostly indistin-
guishable among train and non-train samples. Moreover, in contrast with general
intuition that deeper models have a capacity to memorize training samples, and,
hence, they are more vulnerable to membership inference, we find no evidence to
support that and in some cases deeper models are often harder to launch member-
ship inference attack on. Furthermore, despite the common belief, we show that
overfitting does not necessarily lead to higher degree of membership leakage. We
conduct experiments on MNIST, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and ImageNet, using
various model architecture, including LeNet, ResNet, DenseNet, InceptionV3, and
Xception. Source code: https://github.com/shrezaei/MI-Attack.
1 Introduction
There is an extensive recent literature on membership inference (MI) attacks on deep learning models
that achieve high MI attack accuracy [16, 15, 8, 18, 9, 20, 10, 21]. These MI attack models often
use confidence values of the target model to infer the membership of an input sample. High MI
attack accuracy is often justified by claiming that deep learning models are more confident towards
the training (member) samples than the samples they have not seen during training1. Consequently,
MI attack accuracy is reported to be highly correlated to model’s overfitting or generalization gap
[15, 16, 18] because an overfitted model should perhaps behave even more confident towards training
samples.
In this paper, we show that the attack accuracy reported in literature is misleading. In general, we find
that accuracy of MI attacks on majority of training samples are not much better than a random
guess. We show that existing MI attack models mostly distinguish correctly classified samples
from misclassified samples, rather than distinguishing train samples from non-train samples.
As a result, the MI attack performance essentially represents the gap between the train accuracy
and test accuracy, i.e. generalization gap. To better understand the performance of MI attacks that
1In this paper, we use training samples and member samples interchangeably. Moreover, we also use
non-training, test, and non-member interchangeably.
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Figure 1: The effect of overfitting on MI attack, where the target model is a simple CNN model
with two convolutional blocks and the task is CIFAR-10. (a) By analyzing the entire dataset as a
whole, one may conclude that confidence values are distinguishable feature and MI attack accuracy
improves when overfitting occurs. (b) For the correctly labeled samples, model behavior is almost
similar for training and test set. (c) For the misclassified samples, there exist a noticeable gap in
average confidence values between the train and test set, and, hence, the MI attack accuracy is higher.
exploit generalization gap, we introduce a naive and impractical attack, called blind attack. Blind
attack predicts a sample as member if it is correctly labeled by the target model, and predicts it as
non-member if misclassified. As shown in Figure 1(a), the accuracy of MI attack is almost the same
as that of the blind attack. This clearly shows that reporting only the accuracy, shown in Figure 1(a),
is misleading because it cannot reveal how much MI attacks exploit the generalization gap instead of
learning a representative and effective distinguishable features of train and test samples.
To better demonstrate how current MI attacks work, we separate datasets into two parts: correctly
classified samples and misclassified samples. As shown in Figure 1(b) and (c), the MI attack on
correctly classified samples barely outperform a random guess, while MI attack on misclassified
samples is slightly more effective. In general, we find that membership inference of correctly
classified samples, independent of what dataset or model is used, is a more difficult task than the
membership inference of misclassified samples.
Interestingly, as target models overfit (starting from epoch 20 in Figure 1(a)), the MI attack accuracy
over correctly classified samples barely changes (Figure 1(b)). At the same time, the training accuracy
increases, that is, more training samples are correctly classified. Therefore, for the majority of training
samples (that are correctly classified), membership inference becomes more difficult. Hence, contrary
to common beliefs, overfilling does not necessarily lead to more privacy leakage, although it may
hurt the model generalization.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We show that attack accuracy alone is a misleading measure and an unreliable blind attack
can generate similar accuracy. Instead, we study the accuracy of correctly classified samples
and misclassified samples separately. We show that membership inference of correctly
classified samples, to which the majority of training samples belong, is a very difficult
task.
• We perform MI attack on various datasets (including MNIST, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and
ImageNet), and models (LeNet, ResNet, DenseNet, InceptionV3, Xception, etc), some of
which are studied for the first time in the MI context. We conduct experiments such that
they give a lot more advantages to the attacker than in any previous work. Even in this
case, we show that a meaningful membership inference attack with high accuracy is not
achievable. Moreover, we show that deeper models does not necessarily memorize and leak
more training samples, and in many cases MI attacks are less effective on them.
• In addition to confidence values of the target model, we extensively analyze and use other
information available from the target model, including values from intermediate layers, the
gradient w.r.t input, gradient w.r.t to model weight, and distance to the decision boundary.
These types of information slightly leak more membership status than confidence values,
but they still do not suffice for a reliable MI attack in practice. Surprisingly, all evidence
suggests that deep models often behave similarly on train and non-train samples across
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all these metrics. The only considerable difference appears between correctly classified
samples and misclassified samples, not between the train and non-train samples.
In summary, membership inference of correctly classified samples, to which the majority of training
samples belong, is a very difficult task. However, we are hesitant to generalize our results to all
scenarios and perhaps more research is needed, some of which are as follows:
• We do not extend our conclusion to generative models. High capacity generative models can
often memorize training samples, which can be retrieved at inference time, as shown in [1].
However, there is no trivial method to retrieve memorized samples from a discriminative
model even if it memorizes training samples.
• We do not extend the conclusion to any attack that can be launched during the training phase,
such as data poisoning, model/training manipulation [17], etc. We only study membership
inference on naturally trained models and natural datasets. Deep models may behave very
differently if any unnatural manipulation appears during the training phase.
• In each dataset, there often exists outliers. The MI attack maybe more successful on these
samples [10], whether they are classified correctly or not.
2 Related Work
The first membership inference attack on deep models is proposed by Shokri et al. in [16]. The key
idea is to build a machine learning attack model that takes the target model’s output (confidence
values) to infer the membership of the target model’s input. To train the attack models, membership
dataset containing (xconf , ymem) pairs is needed where xconf represents the confidence values
obtained by the target model for each sample and ymem is a binary variable indicating whether the
sample is used in target model’s training or not. To build the membership dataset, a set of shadow
models are trained for which the training and non-training samples are known. The attack is possible
under two assumptions [15]: (a) the shadow models share the same structure as the target model,
and (b) the training dataset used to train the shadow models share the same distribution as the one
used to train the target model. To mitigate these limitations, Salem et al. [15] relax the second
assumption by showing the attack is possible using different datasets and the first assumption by
proposing a threshold-based attack that does not require a training procedure. To further relax these
assumptions, several studies [8, 18, 9, 20, 10, 21] introduce better dataset generating procedures for
shadow models, and extend the experiments to various scenarios and datasets. However, all studies
share the same idea of using target model’s output for membership inference. In this paper, we show
that the output of deep learning models are often similar for correctly labeled samples, whether they
were used in training or not.
3 The Case of Misleading Report
First, we need to shed a light on the issue of misleading reports. Membership inference is a binary
classification and, hence, it is commonly compared to a random guess which achieves 50% accuracy.
Intuitively, a MI attack that shows a significant accuracy improvement over 50% of the random guess
is considered to be an effective MI attack. However, this comparison does not reveal what is learned
by the attack model. We show that the blind attack can achieve the same accuracy despite being
useless in practice. Hence, a useful MI attack model should considerably outperform blind attack.
Why is the bind attack useless in practice? The goal of membership inference attack in reality
is often to correctly identify training (member) samples. The reason is that in practice any given
sample input can be assumed to be non-member because the training samples constitute only a very
small portion of possible natural inputs. Hence, in reality, the membership inference problem is a
highly imbalanced problem where the members class is the minority class. In this case, the blind
attack achieves very low accuracy. However, in experimental settings, this is usually reversed because
the majority of available samples is used to train the target model. In such unrealistic experimental
setting, the blind attack represents high accuracy if the generalization gap is non-negligible. This
misleading illusion of high accuracy leads to an unreliable MI attack model if used in reality where
the majority of given correctly classified samples do not actually belong to the train set (see more
discussions in Appendix A.1). This also explains why current MI attacks report high accuracy.
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Figure 2: Distribution of average confidence values for CIFAR 100 dataset (ResNet) (class 94)
How can we analyze if an MI attack exploits the generalization gap? Given that the blind
attack is useless in practice, a good MI attack must have at least two features to be considered
useful: (a) performing significantly better than the blind attack during experimental evaluations,
and (b) relying on more informative features than only the correctness/incorrectness of the target
model prediction. Reporting MI attack performance metrics alongside the blind attack can solve
the first problem. Furthermore, we propose to report the performance of MI attack on correctly
labeled samples and misclassified samples separately to solve the both issues. Regardless of the
balanced accuracy of the blind attack on the entire dataset, the balanced accuracy of the blind attack
on correctly classified samples and misclassified samples are always exactly 50%, when they are
reported separately. This separation allows us to use 50% accuracy as a baseline similar to all typical
binary tasks informatively. A good MI attack model which exploits target models leakage rather
than only correctness/incorrectness of the prediction should achieve reasonable balanced accuracy on
correctly labeled samples and misclassified samples separately.
4 Methodology
Threat model and assumptions In this paper, we gives an attacker the most relaxed limitations
to show that even in such cases membership inference cannot significantly outperforms a random
guess. We assume a white-box access to the model and unlimited number of queries. Moreover, we
give the membership status of up to 80% of training samples and test samples to the attackers and we
only ask the attack model to predict the membership inference of the remaining samples. Hence, the
attack performance we report in this paper is as good as or better than any proposed attack based on
shadow models [16, 9] or transferred or synthesized data [8, 15]. In addition to confidence values of
the target model, which have been used extensively for membership inference attack in the past, we
also study the output of intermediate layers, distance to the decision boundary and a set of gradient
norms to better understand if deep models behave differently on training and test samples.
Confidence values Confidence values, or the output of Softmax layer, have been widely used for
membership inference [16, 15, 8, 18, 9, 20, 10, 21]. Figure 2 shows the distribution of average
confidence for correctly classified samples and misclassified samples of a typical model. As it is
shown, misclassified samples often show different distribution for training samples and test samples.
However, correctly classified samples often saturate the true class confidence value and zero out other
confidence values. We show in Section 5 that membership inference attack models are often fail to
considerably outperform a coin toss for correctly labeled samples.
Output of intermediate layers In deep models, first layers often extract general and simple features
that are not specific to training samples. As suggested in [13], the last layer and layers close to the last
one contain more sample-specific information. Hence, we also use the output of the fully connected
layers before the Softmax for membership inference attacks.
Distance to the decision boundary Some research focuses on understanding decision boundary
of deep models [11, 7] or geometry and space of deep models [4, 12] to often understand the nature
of adversarial examples or to improve robustness. In this paper, we investigate whether the distance
to boundary is a distinguishable feature for training and test samples to be used for membership
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Table 1: Accuracy of various datasets, target models, and MI attack models
Dataset MNIST CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100 CIFAR-100 CIFAR-100 ImageNet ImageNet
Model LeNet CNN2 CNN3 DenseNet ResNet56 InceptionV3 Xception
Train 99.74% 97.44% 97.38% 88.15% 99.46% 87.91% 87.77%
Test 99.05% 82.07% 55.63% 56.52% 57.36% 79.98% 80.70%
MI Attack 50.04% 57.27% 74.01% 65.23% 74.46% 50.03% 51.18%
Blind Attack 50.07% 57.13% 70.23% 65.68% 71.97% 54.12% 53.37%
inference. To find the distance to the decision boundary, we use FGM [3] optimization procedure to
craft an image on the other side of the decision boundary. Then, we perform a binary search to find
an instance for which the model’s confidence for two classes are almost equal, that is, the difference
between two confidences is smaller than a small threshold, similar to [7]. Finally, we obtain the
L2 distance between the original sample and the crafted samples as a measure of distance to the
boundary (See Appendix A.2 for the algorithm).
Gradient norm It has been shown that the gradient of loss with respect to model parameters, ∂L∂w , is
often smaller for training samples than non-training samples [13] and it can be used for membership
inference attack in federated learning scenario. In this paper, we study the gradient of loss with
respect to model parameters, ∂L∂w , and also the gradient of loss with respect to model input,
∂L
∂x . The
large value for the former indicates that major re-tuning of model parameters is needed for that
sample, and hence, it can be an indication of a non-member sample. The large value of the latter
indicates that there are input samples with better output in the vicinity of that sample, and hence,
it can be an indication of a non-training sample. Both ∂L∂w and
∂L
∂x are extremely high dimensional.
Thus, we adopt the seven norms used in [14], originally used for analysis of deep model’s uncertainty,
namely L1, L2, absolute minimum, L∞, mean, Skewness, and Kurtosis.
5 Experimental Evidence
Target models and datasets We train various CNN-based models on four image classification
tasks: MNIST, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, ImageNet. For MNIST, we train LeNet model. For CIFAR-10
and CIFAR-100, we train a shallow CNN-based models with 2 (CNN2) and 3 (CNN3) convolutional
blocks with a single fully connected (FC) layer, respectively. Each convolutional block contains two
convolution layers with 3× 3 receptive fields and a max pooling of size 2× 2. FC layers have 128
and 1024 neurons for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, respectively. Additionally, we train DenseNet [6]
and ResNet56 [5] models for CIFAR-100 dataset. For ImageNet, we use pre-trained InceptionV3
[19] and Xception [2] models without any re-training. For ImageNet, we conduct experiments with
only 100 classes out of 1000 classes due to the limited computational and time budget. We use Adam
optimizer with a learning rate of 0.001. We do not perform any data augmentation or any special
weight initialization, such as the one proposed in [5], or extensive hyper parameter tuning.
MI attack models In most cases, we fit three types of attack models: FC neural network (NN),
random forest (RF), and XGBoost. For the NN model, we train a model with 2 hidden layers of size
128 and 64. For RF and XGBoost, we perform a random search over a large set of hyper-parameters.
In this paper, we only report the best MI attack accuracy we achieve over all attack models and
hyper-parameters. Note that the goal of this paper is to show the inefficacy of the best possible
MI attack, not to show which attack model can marginally outperform the others. The input of
attack models varies which is described in each following subsection. The target and MI attack
model performances are shown in Table 1. Note that even the best MI attack models can barely
outperform the blind attack.
5.1 Confidence Values
Confidence values are extensively used for MI attacks. As shown in Table 2, the MI attacks are more
successful on inferring membership of misclassified samples, which often consist a small portion of
training samples. Interestingly, the state-of-the-art target models on ImageNet does not even leak
membership status of misclassified samples. The highest MI attack accuracy on correctly classified
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Table 2: Membership attack results based on confidence values
Dataset(Model) - Attack Accuracy Train Confidence Test Confidence
All data 50.04%± 0.11 99.61± 4.57 98.90± 9.14
MNIST Correctly classified 49.98%± 0.01 99.81± 2.04 99.75± 2.51
Misclassified 62.30%± 17.93 77.61± 16.05 87.09± 15.93
All data 57.27%± 3.11 95.09± 13.87 79.49± 34.41
CIFAR-10 (CNN2) Correctly classified 50.04%± 0.06 96.58± 9.46 94.74± 12.40
Misclassified 62.14%± 7.72 59.15± 17.09 73.64± 21.81
All data 74.0%± 7.9 95.73%± 10.82 54.93%± 42.75
CIFAR-100 (CNN3) Correctly classified 58.16%± 5.11 96.48%± 8.02 89.14%± 17.39
Misclassified 79.39%± 24.39 60.42%± 15.68 64.68%± 22.61
All data 65.23%± 6.43 83.39%± 27.61 54.14%± 43.36
CIFAR-100 (DenseNet) Correctly classified 52.24%± 2.93 92.17%± 13.76 90.07%± 16.17
Misclassified 58.94%± 15.22 63.82%± 19.47 68.64%± 21.87
All data 74.46%± 8.12 99.03%± 6.57 54.53%± 46.19
CIFAR-100 (ResNet) Correctly classified 55.35%± 4.02 99.43%± 3.4 94.9%± 11.84
Misclassified 83.34%± 23.46 72.75%± 17.14 81.61%± 19.62
All data 50.03%± 0.28 76.03%± 25.52 68.62%± 29.43
ImageNet (InceptionV3) Correctly classified 50.03%± 0.31 83.99%± 15.55 81.85%± 16.37
Misclassified 51.5%± 8.57 13.57%± 11.44 10.8%± 9.38
All data 51.18%± 3.56 73.56%± 25.56 66.92%± 28.58
ImageNet (Xception) Correctly classified 50.72%± 3.57 81.24%± 16.81 79.08%± 17.18
Misclassified 51.95%± 19.29 13.48%± 10.94 11.27%± 8.94
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Figure 3: Distribution of the confidence of the true class for correctly labeled samples. The distribution
of the target model confidence for the true class is similar across training and test samples. There are
some small peaks out of the [0.8, 1] range which can be often detected by MI attack models. That is
the reason MI attacks achieve slightly accuracy than a random guess.
samples is observed on CNN3 model trained on CIFAR-100, which is 58.16%. However, this is only
slightly better than a random guess which renders it impractical for accurate membership inference.
Note that the balanced accuracy of the blind attack on only correctly classified (or misclassified
samples) is always 50% regardless of the accuracy over all samples. Therefore, when reading the
accuracy of correctly classified or misclassified samples, the baseline can be considered to be 50%.
However, when reading the accuracy over all data, one should compare with the blind attack accuracy
(in Table 1).
The table also shows the average confidence value of the training samples and test samples. For
correctly classified samples, the average confidence gap between training and test samples are smaller
than misclassified samples. Despite the clear difference between average confidence of training
samples and test samples, the high variance makes classification unreliable. As shown in Figure 3,
the confidence values of training and test samples of correctly labeled samples often show similar
distribution. The existence of outliers can often be seen on the histogram that accounts for slight
improvement of MI attack accuracy.
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Table 3: MI attack accuracy based on the output of intermediate layers. In all following reports, attacks
that demonstrate more than 1% percent attack accuracy improvement over confidence value-based
attack are marked as bold.
Dataset (Model) Layer Correctly classified misclassified
MNIST -1 51.03± 4.64 52.50± 0.30
-2 49.74± 0.14 50.62± 0.41
CIFAR-10 -1 50.22± 0.28 59.89± 4.84
-2 50.92± 1.60 57.86± 4.40
CIFAR-100 (CNN3) -1 50.30± 2.19 63.36± 4.20
-2 50.09± 0.74 58.76± 5.47
CIFAR-100 (DenseNet) -1 51.59± 4.64 57.21± 7.34
CIFAR-100 (ResNet) -1 50.96± 3.49 50.28± 5.58
ImageNet (InceptionV3) -1 50.09± 0.56 50.96± 2.74
ImageNet (Xception) -1 51.31± 6.03 56.42± 13.93
Table 4: Average L2 distance of an input to decision boundary and MI attack accuracy. C and I
represents CIFAR and ImageNet, respectively.
Dataset (Model) Correctly Classified Misclassified
- MI Attack Average Distance MI Attack Average Distance
- Accuracy Train Test Accuracy Train Test
MNIST 50.06%± 6.08 1.3726± .4001 1.3714± .4512 49.81%± 9.05 0.0103± .0016 0.0108± .0024
C-10 54.44%± 6.05 0.2133± .1679 0.1849± .1718 48.7%± 5.27 0.0053± .0098 0.0048± .0088
C-100 (CNN3) 58.52%± 9.00 0.2467± .1723 0.1911± .1698 59.9%± 1.24 0.0015± .0025 0.0034± .0063
C-100 (DenseNet) 53.58%± 6.60 0.1512± .1254 0.1692± .1426 47.8%± 15.06 0.0044± .0088 0.0041± .0085
C-100 (ResNet) 59.54%± 8.39 0.0312± .0264 0.0411± .0285 52.63%± 18.60 0.0214± .0111 0.0164± .0124
I (InceptionV3) 51.75%± 8.24 212.40± 64.83 218.68± 63.03 44.95%± 11.97 215.84± 67.01 215.16± 61.55
I (Xception) 53.01%± 9.57 214.51± 64.64 216.23± 61.98 49.29%± 13.50 212.42± 67.04 214.76± 64.02
5.2 Output of Intermediate Layers
The attack accuracy based on the output of intermediate layers are shown in Table 3. We only launch
an attack on the output of FC or flattened layers. The layer column shows the number of layers we go
back from the Softmax layer. Interestingly, as we go back from the last layer, deep learning models
leak less membership status, expect for Xception model on ImageNet which slightly leaks more
membership status on misclassified samples.
5.3 Distance to the Boundary
Since the distance to the decision boundary is one-dimensional, we only fit a logistic regression to
the samples. As shown in Table 4, on average, the misclassified samples of train and test sets share
almost the same distance to the boundary. Interestingly, for correctly classified samples, a MI attack
model based on distance to the decision boundary marginally outperforms attack models based on
confidence values across most datasets and model architecture. However, the attack accuracy is still
low.
5.4 Gradient Norm
Table 5 shows the accuracy of MI attack model based on gradient norms. For each case, we fit a
logistic regression to the 7 norms introduced in Section 4. Gradient norms w.r.t x is more effective for
correctly classified samples while the the gradient norms w.r.t w is more effective for misclassified
samples. Gradient w.r.t x often leak more membership status than all other metrics for correctly
classified samples. Nevertheless, the results are still far away from a reliable MI attack.
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Table 5: Accuracy of attack model based on gradient norms with respect to input (x) and weights (w)
Dataset (Model) Correctly Classified Misclassified
- Grad w.r.t w Grad w.r.t x Grad w.r.t w Grad w.r.t x
MNIST 52.06%± 3.37 53.19%± 3.52 57.84%± 26.8 52.02%± 22.2
CIFAR-10 50.56%± 4.44 51.19%± 2.8 61.89%± 10.41 52.94%± 12.05
CIFAR-100 (CNN3) 61.03%± 8.77 61.19%± 8.8 61.81%± 15.43 61.98%± 9.91
CIFAR-100 (DenseNet) 51.13%± 7.3 54.9%± 7.87 50.58%± 12.31 53.71%± 11.03
CIFAR-100 (ResNet) 58.91%± 8.2 59.19%± 8.01 56.07%± 15.8 53.33%± 17.3
ImageNet (InceptionV3) 49.25%± 11.77 52.10%± 9.63 58.48%± 15.38 50.55%± 16.51
ImageNet (Xception) 51.65%± 8.23 53.23%± 9.15 55.62%± 15.52 46.12%± 14.4
Table 6: The effect of deep model’s depth on MI attack based on confidence values. The last digit in
the model name represents the number of convolutional blocks.
Dataset (Model) Target Model Accuracy Blind Attack Accuracy MI Attack Accuracy
- Train Test All Data All Data Correctly Classified Misclassified
CIFAR-10 (CNN1) 95.48% 71.87% 61.94%± 3.68 63.08%± 3.42 53.17± 1.78 62.06± 1.71
CIFAR-10 (CNN2) 95.82% 81.84% 57.15%± 2.92 58.28%± 2.82 52.14± 1.19 60.45± 4.59
CIFAR-10 (CNN3) 97.97% 84.76% 56.43%± 3.46 57.48%± 3.44 51.56± 1.64 58.22± 14.90
CIFAR-100 (CNN1) 99.87% 39.49% 80.24%± 8.43 87.08%± 7.85 70.13%± 9.34 96.93%± 11.98
CIFAR-100 (CNN2) 99.55% 51.86% 74.12%± 7.23 80.48%± 7.85 64.84%± 7.63 93.78%± 16.36
CIFAR-100 (CNN3) 98.46% 55.61% 70.23%± 7.35 74.01%± 7.90 58.16%± 5.11 79.39%± 24.39
CIFAR-100 (CNN4) 96.72% 58.59% 69.05%± 7.47 71.84%± 7.54 56.67%± 4.84 71.29%± 24.21
5.5 Effect of Model Depth
We train a set of CNN-based models on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. Table 6 demonstrates the effect of
model’s depth on model’s membership leakage. Despite the general intuition that the deeper models
tend to memorize training samples, deeper models are more resistant to membership inference attack
on both correctly classified samples and misclassified samples. The reason is two-folded: (a) the gap
between the train and test accuracy drops as model’s depth increases which degrade the accuracy of
attack models relying on generalization gap, and (b) the deeper models behave more similarly across
train and test samples, the effect of which is reflected on the reduction of MI attack accuracy on both
correctly classified samples and misclassified samples. The MI attack accuracy over training epochs
and the effect of overfitting for these models are presented in Appendix A.3 and A.4.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that commonly-used MI attacks based on confidence values of deep models
are not practical and reliable as it has been reported before. Throughout exhaustive experimentation
on various datasets and deep model architectures, we show that membership inference attacks barely
outperform a simple blind attack that predict membership status of a sample based on whether the
target model classifies it correctly or not. We demonstrate the problem of reporting attack accuracy
on the entire dataset alone, and we report the attack accuracy on correctly classified samples and
misclassified samples separately to show how much membership attack improvement over the blind
attack is possible. Moreover, we show that deeper models are less prone to membership inference
attack and the membership inference of correctly classified samples, to which most training samples
belong, is a considerably more difficult task than misclassified samples. Additionally, we analyze
several other features of input samples, including the distance to the decision boundary and gradient
norms, to further illustrate the infeasibility of reliable membership inference attack on deep models.
In summary, we find that naturally trained deep models often behave indistinguishably across training
and test samples and, hence, an accurate membership inference attack on all training samples in
practice is not possible unless a new revolutionary approach is introduced.
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Broader Impact
Membership inference, if possible, can lead to privacy breach of training samples. In many applica-
tions, datasets are considered to be sensitive, such as medical data. In this paper, we show that reliable
and accurate membership inference of deep models is an extraordinary difficult task. Moreover, it
becomes almost impossible when input dimension becomes very large. As a result, individuals or
organizations who share or provide public access to their models can be more confident that the
privacy of their training samples are protected. This benefits, however, comes with a legal challenge
when someone wants to show his/her private data has been used without permission. For example,
corporations may hold a large amount of private/sensitive data, such Facebook or Google. They are
not supposed to use certain part of data under certain regulations. However, if they use such data to
train a model, it is hard for users to prove with high confidence that such illegal usage of private data
has occurred. Currently, there is no easy solution to such a problem. One possible ideal solution can
involve a certificate-based proof which can be used by model trainers to show that certain data has not
been used during training, when they are asked. This is still an open problem and we think solving
this problem is more important than focusing on privacy preserving approaches for deep models since
they do not seem to leak much reliable information about membership of training samples.
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A Appendix
A.1 Misleading Report and Imbalanced Problem in MI in Details
Correctly Classified (TC)
Misclassified (TM)
Correctly Classified (NC)
Misclassified (NM) TC
TM
NM
NC
Train Data/Member (T)
Test Data/Non-member (N)
Infinite number of unavailable 
non-member samples (U)
Figure 4: A distribution of member and non-member samples of a typical task. Although T is fixed,
N can practically grows to infinity by obtaining samples from U . Typical MI attack models learn to
separate green regions from the red regions. However, the true goal of membership inference is to
separate solid colored regions from the regions with rotated stripes.
In a typical imbalanced problem, reporting balanced accuracy or precision/recall can reveal the
performance of a model. Unfortunately, this approach still does not address the MI attack experiment
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issue because MI problem has a unique subtlety in comparison with common imbalanced problems:
In MI problem, one class (member) has fixed number of samples and the other class (non-member)
has practically infinite number of samples. Ironically, during experimental evaluations, the number
of samples available from non-member class is much smaller than the member class. As shown in
Figure 4, member samples (T ) are limited and known during evaluation, but only a small portion
of non-member samples (N ) is available during evaluation. The entire non-member samples are
represented by U +N . For the blind attack, all TC and NC (green regions) samples are inferred
to be members and, hence, the precision ( TCTC+NC ) during evaluation is high. However, in practice,
the precision of a random set of samples is almost zero because TC is fixed and NC can grows to
infinity. As an example, in CIFAR-10 dataset, T is 50000, andN is 10000 but it can potentially grows
to the entire U with almost o(2563072) samples. Even if we only consider the naturally occurring
images, the difference is still extremely large. However, these samples are not available during
the experimental evaluations. This shows that although the blind attack can achieve high accuracy
(precision/recall) during evaluation, it is still useless in practice.
A.2 Algorithm to find decision boundary
Algorithm 1 shows the FGM-based method to find the distance to the boundary. It first uses the
gradient of loss w.r.t the input to find the direction for which the confidence decreases and changes
the input slightly towards that direction. This process continues until the input is changed enough to
be labeled as a different class by the target model. This modified sample is considered to be on the
other side of the decision boundary. Then, the algorithm uses the binary search to find a new sample
between these two last modified samples that reside on different side of the decision boundary. The
process stops when a sample is found such that the confidence of the target model for two different
classes are very close.
Algorithm 1 FGM-based algorithm to find distance to the decision boundary
Input: S (maximum number of steps), x (input sample) and y (the sample ground-truth), fcls (an
interface to the target model which returns predicted class), fconf (an interface to the target
model which returns the confidence value of the predicted class), L (target model loss function),
θ (confidence threshold indicating when the algorithm stops optimizing):
1: procedure DISTANCE_TO_BOUNDARY(x, f )
2: x0 = x
3: for t from 0 to S do
4: xt+1 = xt + ε ∇xL(xt,y)||∇xL(xt,y)||2
5: if fcls(xt+1) 6= fcls(xt) then
6: while |fconf (xt+1)− fconf (xt)| > θ do
7: xm = xt+1+xt2
8: if fcls(xm) = fcls(xt) then
9: xt = xm
10: else if fcls(xm) = fcls(xt+1) then
11: xt+1 = xm
12: else
13: return Error!
return ||x0 − xt||2
return Optimization failed!
A.3 CIFAR-10: Effect of model depth and overfitting
In this section, we analyze the accuracy of MI attack models, based on confidence values, over
training procedure. We track three CNN models with various depth, that is, CNN1, CNN2, and
CNN3, containing one, two, and three convolutional blocks, respectively. The result of MI attack over
training epochs are illustrated in Figure 5, 6, and 7. On CIFAR-10 dataset. as the target model gets
deeper, the MI attack accuracy drops slightly. Moreover, as target models overfit, MI attack accuracy
over misclassified samples slightly increases, but the MI attack accuracy of correctly labeled samples
does not change. At the same time, the number of misclassified training samples decreases as target
models overfit. Hence, deeper and slightly overfitted models may slightly improve the privacy of
training samples for CIFAR-10 dataset.
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Figure 5: Training progress and MI attack on CIFAR-10 for CNN1 model with 1 convolutional blocks
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Figure 6: Training progress and MI attack on CIFAR-10 for CNN2 model with 2 convolutional blocks
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(b) Correctly classified samples
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40  45  50
A
cc
ur
ac
y/
Co
nf
id
en
ce
/L
os
s
Epoch
Train loss(*0.1)
Test loss(*0.1)
Train average confidence
Test average confidence
MI attack accuracy
(c) Mis-classified samples
Figure 7: Training progress and MI attack on CIFAR-10 for CNN3 model with 3 convolutional blocks
In general, confidence-based attacks exploit the gap between confidence value of training samples
and non-training samples to perform membership inference. However, at the epoch when the model
starts overfitting (i.e. test loss stops decreasing), the average confidence value of correctly classified
training samples is almost saturated (i.e. becomes almost one). Therefore, overfitting does not
significantly increase the average gap between training and non-training samples that are correctly
classified. This is clearly depicted in Figure 5 (b), 6 (b), and 7 (b). Nevertheless, this is not
true for misclassified samples because the confidence value of misclassified training samples still
increase. As the confidence value of misclassified training samples increase, many of them eventually
becomes correctly classified. Hence, only a small portion of the misclassified training samples remain
misclassified for which the membership inference is a relatively easy task. This is shown in Figure 5
(c), 6 (c), and 7 (c).
A.4 CIFAR-100: Effect of model depth and overfitting
We conduct a similar experiment on CIFAR-100 as in Appendix A.3. We use 4 different CNN models
with 1 to 4 convolutional blocks. The results are depicted in Figures 8, 9, 10, and 11. CIFAR-100
is more difficult task with more classes and fewer samples per class in comparison with CIFAR-10.
The effect of model depth and overfitting is more clear. First, as target models get deeper, the gap
between the blind attack and the MI attack decreases and, consequently, MI attacks become less
effective. Second, the overfitting of a shadow model, such as the CNN1, improves the MI attack on
misclassified samples dramatically, and the MI attack on correctly classified samples non-negligibly.
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(b) Correctly classified samples
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Figure 8: Training progress and MI attack on CIFAR-100 for CNN1 model with 1 convolutional
blocks
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Figure 9: Training progress and MI attack on CIFAR-100 for CNN2 model with 2 convolutional
blocks
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Figure 10: Training progress and MI attack on CIFAR-100 for CNN3 model with 3 convolutional
blocks
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Figure 11: Training progress and MI attack on CIFAR-100 for CNN4 model with 4 convolutional
blocks
Depending on how much accuracy improvement over a random guess is defined as a representation
of a reliable MI attack classifier, overfitting of a shallow model may considered to be detrimental
in terms of protecting the privacy of training samples. However, as show in Figure 10, and 11, for
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Figure 12: Training progress and MI attack based on gradient norms and distance to the decision
boundary on CIFAR-10 for CNN2 model with 2 convolutional blocks
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Figure 13: Training progress and MI attack based on gradient norms and distance to the decision
boundary on CIFAR-100 for CNN3 model with 3 convolutional blocks
deeper models, the MI attack on correctly classified samples remain difficult and infeasible as the
target models overfit.
A.5 Effect of overfitting on gradient and distance to the decision boundary
We conduct several experiments to investigate if overfitting helps MI attacks that use gradient norms
or distance to the decision boundary. The experimental results are demonstrated in Figure 12 and 13
for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, respectively. We only perform the experiments on the most suitable
model, which is CNN2 for CIFAR-10 and CNN3 for CIFAR-100. The attack results are similar
to the attack based on confidence values in previous sections. After overfitting happens, the MI
attack accuracy barely improve for correctly classified samples. However, if the training procedure
continues, the MI attack accuracy on misclassified samples slightly increases. Note that this large
degree of overfitting rarely happens in practice since trainers often use early stop method to prevent
extreme overfitting.
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